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ABSTRACT
George Edward Moore, in his quest to establish a direct realist
account of cognition and to refute skepticism and absolute idealism,
which is a brand of metaphysical monism, argued that at least some of
our beliefs about the world are absolutely certain. Moore argues that
these beliefs are ‘commonsense’. All the arguments put forth by G.E.
Moore in his classic works; A Defense of Commonsense, Proof of An External World, The Nature of Judgment, Refutation of Idealism andA Reply to My Critics are
all in a bid to prove the existence of an absolute external world whose
existence is perceivable (knowable) via the ‘Commonsense’ understanding
of reality (actuality). Although, Moore’s direct realist account of
cognition states that perception or cognition of the external world is
gained via the senses directly unmediated, such that there is no gap
between the human mind and external world objects. However, it was
discovered that the relationship between the distal stimulus and its
percept was indirect; though for Moore the relationship between the
distal stimulus and its percept is direct. Moore’s ontological account
of cognition was quite unique and illuminating; however his ontological
account of cognition was inadequate. The tenability of Moore’s position
is questionable because it can only be sustained on the basis of
naturalization of all epistemological account of cognition in relation
to a given consensual language domain.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
This research work was motivated by some of the intricate
issues raised by Absolute idealism (Metaphysical monism) to
interpret with certainty and objectivity existent reality. Some of these
issues are summarized as follows:
(i) All realities are internally related (doctrine of internal relations)
(ii) The objective truths (for example, of logic
mathematics, ethics, etc) are to be accounted for in terms of the
operations of the subjective cognitive or psychological faculties
(psychologism).
(iii) Objective knowledge is of the universal.
(iv) There exist universal minds to which others are subsumed.
(v) Phenomenological and external realities are copies of original that exist in the world of forms.