ABSTRACT
This work demonstrates that Raz’s infusion of reason as the basis
for enforcing legal demands creates a viable alternative to the previous
understanding that coercion is an essential element of law as
normative system. Joseph Raz describes normative system as a system for
guiding behaviour and for settling disputes which claims supreme
authority to interfere with any kind of activity. It also either
supports or restricts the creation and practice of other norms in the
society. Raz builds his idea of a normative system around resolving the
issue of balancing autonomy and authority which is a recurrent issue in
legal positivism. Legal positivism largely claims that law is a posited
fact, that is, its validity is sought in the source of power, because
law itself proceeds from the will of human beings. However, while rules
constitute normative systems in Hart’s views, Raz insists on a
combination of rule and reason. Adopting the expository, critical and
textual analysis, the purpose of this research is to do an analysis of
the components and structure of normative systems in the philosophy of
Joseph Raz with a view to showing its relevance in dealing with the
issue of insurgency and militancy as it besieges the world today and
Nigeria in particular. Since it is obligation that predominantly elicits
obedience for the law as a normative system but for Raz, there is no
obligation to obey the law; one wonders what will ground the force of
the law in this context?
Following this, the central question for this research is: what
then becomes the basis for the binding force of the law as a normative
system since morality is not?
This work also attempts to: (i) examine whether a conventional
practice can give rise to reasons for actions, which invariably gives
reason-based arguments for explaining authority, (ii) expound Raz’s case
for ‘protected reasons’ that can also function as first-order reason
for actions and (iii) find out whether there is a platform to establish a
relationship between reason and obligation within the normative system
presented by Raz, (iv) attempt a presentation of the relevance of Raz’s
concept of toleration for contemporary life.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Norms and normative systems vary in their structure and components. This is simply
because of the variations in postulations about how norms are
structured, what components make up these structures and entire
normative systems, as well as the extent to which norms and/or laws can
be considered to be coercive. The most common conceptions of normative
systems hold that they are coercive. The consequence, therefore, is that
reason and reasons for actions (which are supposed to be considered to
be primary components of any humane normative system) are rather not
considered by most normative system theorists to the necessary
determinants of the sense of obligation by the citizens of any society.
Joseph Raz builds his ideal of a normative system around resolving the issue of
balancing autonomy and authority. His case for this is directed
chiefly against the anarchists1. Raz repudiates the philosophical
anarchists by arguing that authority can be consistent with autonomy. In
his introduction to his edited volume on authority, Raz wonders: “Can I
not have absolute right to decide my own action while conceding an
equal right to all? That is
anarchy. But it may be that only anarchy avoids the problem of authority2.”
He summarizes the problem as follows: “The duty to obey conveys an
abdication of autonomy, that is, of the right and duty to be responsible
for one’s action and to conduct oneself in the best light of reason. If
there is an authority which is legitimate, then its subjects
are duty bound to obey it whether they agree3 or not. Such a duty
is inconsistent with autonomy, with the right and the duty to act
responsibly, in the light of reason. This is the
challenge of philosophical anarchism.” 4 The task, then, for Raz is
to demonstrate that authority can be consistent with acting “in the bes
t light of reason.” Following this, Raz goes ahead to give his criteria
for the legitimacy of authority.