CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Self: An Existential
Approach.
Existentialism
is better seen as a style of philosophizing rather than a philosophy. Thus, the
existentialists have some patterns of thought following their existential
traits. Hence, they deny that reality can be neatly packaged in concept or
presented as interlocking system. “An
inquisitive style of thought that sets to adopt with ardent mastery the world
in relation to man’s life in it.”1
Jean Paul Sartre, Soren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger made remarkable
imprints among the existentialist thinkers. The basic style of their
philosophizing begins from man rather than nature. A philosophy of the subject
rather than the object per se. William Barrett’s definition of existentialism
sets the existentialists’ agenda in motion:
A philosophy
that confronts human situation in its
totality, to
ask what the basic conditions of human
existence are
and how man can establish his own
meaning out
of these situations.2
From the foregoing therefore,
existential approach to self
is not very difficult to define.
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the
father of modern philosophy was the first to make a dialectical shift in the
history of thought, breaking apart philosophy from the chains of scholastic
‘theocentricism’ to the modern ‘anthropocentricism’. In his famous cogito, he sets out to posit the “I” as the referential point of
existence. Hence, the “I” becomes the starting point and the end point “terminus a quo and terminus ad quem” of his ontological status quo. The ‘I’
becomes the thinking subject.
But, a remarkable attempt to move the
straight points of philosophy from the “abstract thinking subject to more concrete
base, in the total, multi-dimensional human experience of involving in a world
of affairs was carefully explored by John Macmurray.”3
Toeing the same line of argument, the existentialists owe their thought in
agreement with John Macmurray’s view of the self as an ‘agent’
as against the traditional understanding of self as the ‘subject’.
In his own words, “the ‘I’ act (the
self as agent) replaces the ‘I’ think (the self as subject) as the place where
existential philosophy finds its beginning.”4
Thinking according to him is an abstraction from the totality of self as agent. Having given a
skeletal view of the general notion of the existential self as the
existentialism owe to Macmurray, it is very pertinent at this juncture to X-ray
what three front liners existentialists have as their views in relation to
self.
In order to bring the intrinsic
meaning of the existential self to the fore, Soren Kierkegaard driving home his
message made an allusion to the idea of the ‘anonymous crowd’. In his
own words, “Being in a crowd unmakes one’s nature as an
individual self by diluting self.”5 He further stresses:
Acrowd in its very concept is untruth, by reason of the
fact that it renders the individual
completely impenitent and
irresponsible or at least weakens his sense of duty, vision and
responsibility by reducing it to a fraction.6
From a different angle, Martin
Heidegger with a bold stroke shifted the nineteenth century continental
philosophy away from the traditional concerns about theories and focused it
upon the concern of thinking individual (self). He sets out to explore the
deepest nature of self as an existing being.
Fascinated by the question of being (Zeins frage) he desires to explore
the fundamental ontology - the phenomenological analysis of the ‘Dasein’.
In his fundamental task of de-structuring the essential components of the Dasein
he does not intend to joke when he remarks, “Dasein has a
pre-ontological understanding of his own being because; being reveals itself
gratuitously to him.”7 By making serious enquiry into
the meaning of being through rational and fundamental questions, the
existential approach to self in Heidegger’s line of thought is not very
difficult to disclose, implying though it may be.
Jean Paul Sartre not dismissing his
phenomenological background approaches the question of self as the only unique Consciousness. According to him,
The mode of the existence of the
Consciousnesses
is to be conscious of itself and being
conscious of
his consciousness, its law of
existence is correctly
defined.8
He further maintains that
insofar as Consciousnessis conscious of itself, it is purely
absolute. The central message of the celebrated book of Sartre, Being and Nothingness presents an
existential concept of self “as the
unique individual that is essentially free even though in chains, is a master
of his own fate.”9 He therefore
projects the self in conformity with the analysis of Cartesian thought,
as individual human being seeking for apodictic certainty as a referential
point of departure. The actual message of self in Sartrian philosophy may not be correctly sent without
the cause to “make a veritable insight
into the ontological and epistemological variations, wherein the Cartesian cogito becomes essentially
manifested.”10
Hans Gadamer would have
been forgotten in the arc of intellectual history if not for his celebrated
line ‘No one speaks from nowhere’,
thus, to speak implies speaking from a particular point of view. Bearing this
in mind, the question of self in Sartrian philosophy may not be exhaustively
explored without a necessary reference to his phenomenological background.
1.2 Existentialism: A
Phenomenological Background.
The word “phenomenology” has
quite a long history in philosophy. Occasionally, it was employed by Immanuel
Kant to stand for the study of phenomena or appearances as opposed to
things-in- themselves. Hegel, in his phenomenology of mind, used the word for
his exposition of the manifestations of the stages of the mind, from
perception, through the forms of consciousness, to the highest intellectual
spiritual activities. Husserl’s Introduction to Pure Phenomenology bracketed,
questions concerning reality and tends to devise
method
for detailed and accurate description
of various kinds in
their pure essences.11
A brief intellectual tour in the
existentialists’ environment will reveal that, it was Edmund Husserl
(1859-1938) that first picked up the intellectual relay- race in the German
phenomenology. Thrilled by the Cartesian cogito, he plans to establish
from a phenomenological background, the self, from the focal point of
action as the existing agent. The undeniable influence he asserted on his successors,
thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Merleau-ponty and Jean Paul Sartre carried
along the phenomenological relay race. Due to the fact that existentialism owes
its definitive emergence to phenomenology, invariably most existentialists are
phenomenologist though the reverse may not be the case, notwithstanding, there
is an undeniable fact of close tie that developed between the two styles of
philosophy. The fact is obvious; “Phenomenology
seems to offer existentialism the kind of methodology necessary to pursue the
investigations into human existence.”12
Fascinated by Cartesian methodic doubt, Husserl radicalized its
tenets with a certain degree of consequence. The transcendental consciousness
could no longer be characterized in
terms of a thinking matter, a ‘res cogitans’ but an acting
matter. In his argument, he stresses that if consciousness only exists as
consciousness of something, then, Husserl’s interpretation of the methodic
doubt implies that the ‘physical ‘I’ would perish along the line, “because the
‘I’ presents the character of an object.”13
The existentialists developed
phenomenology to suit their own purpose. The point of divergence between
Husserl and the existential phenomenologists is not very difficult to pinpoint.
Whereas the former places emphasis on essence and approaches phenomenology as
an apodictic science, the latter stresses on existence. The existentialists’
allegiance to existence could be seen in Sartre’s assertion ‘existence precedes
essence’. In this regard, they refuted Kantian dualism that supposed some
hidden ‘noumena’ of which the ‘phenomena’ is merely the appearance.
In his book ‘L’Action’,
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) argues, “the starting point of philosophy should be
sought not in abstract ‘I’ think but in the concrete ‘I’ act.”14 To buttress this fact, the
existentialists insist on action, for according to them, only in action does
existence attains correctness and fullness. Where thought, passion and inward
decision are lacking, there will be nothing worthy of the name action. Despite
the premium existentialists place upon action, it does not seem to connote they
are pragmatists. A proper juxtaposition of the differences and similarities of
both the former and latter leads us into the next sub-heading. The pragmatists
and the existentialists without doubts place a greater percentage on man as a
deciding agent. But as the former views man as a functional man the
later approaches him from the point of ‘Homo Viator’. The former to a
greater extent highlights optimism from the utilitarian standpoint. They occupy
themselves with issues of success in every undertaking, with a little or no
attention to the tragic and frustrating sides of life as expressed in most
existentialists’ writings.
Berdyaev clearly remarks the difference
between the duo in his words, however
close the latter could be at some points with the former:
They are distinguished from them by the
fact that their interest
is in the intensity of life even its
tragic intensity rather than its
outward expansion and success.”15
The existentialists acknowledge the
obvious situations of man’s existence as a fact of life. This I plan to unmask
in the preceding sub-heading.
1.3 Facticity of Existence
A simple look at this phrase elicits
the two contending concepts: Fact and Existence. In philosophy of science,
facts are said to be the ultimate tribunal. As such without facts, there would
not be any result. The issue is not different in the field of law and other
disciplines.
‘To exist’ from its Latin etymology ‘ex-sistere’
means, ‘to stand out’, ‘to emerge’. To ‘lie around’ seem to highlight the
clearer meaning of existence in recent times- ontological location. Here, to
exist implies to be located somewhere in the world, to have a place in the real
world. In passing the message of what it means to exist, Martin Heidegger made
allusion to the idea of ‘Dasein’. Jean Paul Sartre explores the content
of the ‘Pour-soi’ for-itself. The question above all is, what the facts
of existence are in the existential mind? Existentialists use the word
‘Facticity’ to designate the limiting factor in existence. From etymology the
word had been coined to translate the German ‘Faktizitat’ and French ‘Facticite’.
It is as opposed to the background of the word factuality that has to do with
objective state of affairs observable in the world. It is an inward existential awareness of
one’s own being. No one has chosen to be. As Augustine Farrer voices out “The
loneliness of personality in the universe weighs heavily upon us, it seems
terribly improbable that we should exist.”16
Man from time immemorial has formed some beliefs or even revelations about his
origin and destiny. How truthful or valid such assumptions are, may not be our
concern here. The only fact we know beyond doubt is that ‘we are’. Where we
came from and where we are going remains under the confines of mystery.
Existence never escapes from the tension between possibility and facticity.
Facticity opens for us the radical finitude of human existence.
Robert Cumming gave a clearer insight
to facticity as portrayed in Sartre’s ideology. The “for-itself” is, insofar as
it appears in a condition which it has not chosen, it is, in so far as it is
thrown into the world and abandoned in a situation.”17 In the thought of Heidegger, facticity
means that man finds himself in situation where he is bound to be. ‘Throwness’,
‘Geworfenheit’ in Heideggerian thought underlines to a greater extent
the intrinsic meaning of facticity. “Being thrown into existence, without his
prior knowledge the ‘Dasein’ finds himself in a circumstance that is not
his own making.”18 Facticity is an
outright revelation of the limitations of the ‘Dasein’. In a case, the ‘Dasein’
realizes some givens beyond his control, things he cannot alter even if he
wants to.
Some factors project certain
unavoidable existential situations. Death, Temporality, Guilt and Alienation
tend to summarize those inescapable conditions of life. As Heidegger rightly
puts, death is the possibility of the impossibility of existence. Heidegger is
one of the existentialists that never approached the issue of death with
reservation. At death alone could the ‘Dasein’ be correctly defined. He
sees death as the last possibility of all, that which makes impossible any
further possibility. In temporality, man’s nature as being time-bound is
re-defined. Man as creature of time must pass away in time. The transience of
human life is one of the most poignant aspects of finitude. No matter, whatever
may be the case; man must be a client to the tribunal of birth and death.
Pessimistic though the
existentialists may seem to be, as some thinkers argue as opposed to
pragmatists, they have always not failed to recognize the obvious fact of
disorder in human existence. Thus, man experiences guilt and sometimes feels
alienated from what he encounters around him.
Karl Marx pointed the fact of
alienation in the revolutionary changes in man’s material condition. From the
existential angle, alienation implies that one is mortgaged in inauthentic
existence. Without facticity, Robert Cumming, avows “Consciousness would choose
its attachment to the world in the same way as souls in Plato’s republic choose
their condition.”19
1 J.Macquarie, Existentialism (New York: World-Publishing Co,
1972), p.14
2 T.Ajayi, Freedom, Choice and Responsibility (WAJOPS: vol.7,
AECAWA Publication, 2004), p.79.
5S.E.Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems (U.S.A: Mc Graw-
Hill, 5th (ed.), 1971), p.487.
7 C.Ekwutosi,
unpublished lecture note on Heidegger’s Metaphysics (Pope John Paul II Seminary Awka, 2005), p.2
8 R.Cumming, The Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre (New York, Random House, Inc., 1965), p.51.
9 The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, (ed) Christian Howells
(U.S.A: Cambridge Uni.Press, 1992), p.68.
11 J. Macquarie, Op.cit, p.22.
13 Cambridge Companion to Sartre, Op. cit p.72.
14 J. Macquarie, Op.cit.p.59.
17 R. Cumming, Op.cit, p.167.
18 C. Ekwutosi, Op.cit, p.3.