TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title
page……………………………………………………………………ii
Certification...................................................................................................iii
Dedication......................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgements........................................................................................v
Table of contents............................................................................................vi
Abstract........................................................................................................viii
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Theories of Truth....................................................................................1
1.1 The nature and traditional
theories of truth…..........................................2
1.2 The semantic theory of
truth...................................................................4
1.3 The correspondence
theory of
truth........................................................6
1.4 The coherence theory of truth..................................................................8
1.5 The pragmatic theory of
truth...............................................................12
End
Notes...............................................................................................16
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 Correspondence Theory of
Truth…........................................................18
2.1 Wiredu’s critiques of
the correspondence theory of truth.......................18
2.2 General thesis..........................................................................................21
2.3 Truth as
opinion......................................................................................25
End Notes………...................................................................................34
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 Truth as Opnion.......................................................................................36
3.1 Objections and counter
objections to truth as opinion............................37
3.2 P.O
Bodunrin...........................................................................................39
3.3 Abdul Ghaniyi
Bello...............................................................................42
3.4 Wiredu’s replies to
critics.......................................................................44
End Notes...............................................................................................46
CHAPTER FOUR: Evaluation and Conclusion
4.1 An evaluation of
Wiredu’s thesis............................................................47
4.2
Conclusion...............................................................................................55
End Notes.................................................................................................58
Bibliography............................................................................................59
ABSTRACT
Wiredu’s recent significant contribution to epistemology
reviews the relationship between knowledge, truth and existence.
In
this theory Kwasi Wiredu attempts to refute the supposition that truth is a
relation the supposition that truth is a relation between statements about the
world and the world itself. He argues against objectivist claims to knowledge
i.e, that knowledge is of a thing as it is in itself and that appearance is
different from opinion.
Wiredu argues against the attempts to distinguish between
truth of opinion and truth of knowledge and the position by which Wiredu
institutes his thesis is a claim that “Truth is an opinion”. He calls this a
special case of general proposition that has to be apprehended.
In
this essay, my main contention is that Kwasi Wiredu is identifying truth with
opinion, fails to give a true account of human reality because his thesis
discards completely the distinction that should be obtained between truth and
opinion, thereby making falsehood impossible, and truth subjective.
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 THEORIES OF TRUTH
My
essay centers especially on the epistemological conviction of Kwasi Wiredu with
regards problem of truth.
My
intention in this essay is to critically evaluate all the strands of Wiredu’s
argument in support of his thesis that there is nothing called truth that is
different from opinion. I contend that in arguing that truth is nothing but mere
opinion, Wiredu fails in denying truth of its objective characters. I also
submit that Wiredu fail in making truth subjective. This is inspite of his
avowed attempts at clarifying the senses in which he uses such concepts as
“Truth” and ‘opinion’.
Consequently, this essay has been divided into four
chapters in order that I will be better placed to understand the background to
Wiredu’s position and also his main thesis.
In
chapter one, I shall discuss generally the notion of truth in traditional western
epistemology. In this chapter, I shall try to briefly analyze the basic
proposition of the main objectivistic theories of truth, that is the semantic
and the correspondence theories of truth and also examine the two non
objectivistic theories of truth namely, the coherence and the pragmatic
theories of truth. And as we shall discover Wiredu’s position is neither wholly
pragmatic nor wholly coherent. He simply affirms both theories to some extent.
As we shall see in this chapter that Wiredu believe that truth is coherence,
also following Deweyian pragmatic principles Wiredu asserts that truth is
“Warranted assertibility “.
In chapter two, I shall discuss in detail Wiredu’s thesis
on trut h to the effect that to be true is simply to be opined. Prior to this
would be consideration of his formal critique of the correspondence theory of
truth, which is the most forceful representation of all objectivistic theories
of truth. I shall discuss also his general thesis, which states that “To be is to be known”.
In the third chapter, I shall begin by presenting the
critique that have been levelled against
Wiredu’s position by three
contemporary African philosophers, Joseph Omoregbe, P.O Bodunrin,
and Abdu Ghaniyi Bello, I shall then
consider Wiredu’s replies to some of the critics.
In evaluating this essay, I will, in chapter
four, point out and critically analyze the flaws which I believe in Wiredu’s
system, and then proceed to show my own conviction s on how truth is to be
conceived and treated.
1.1 THE NATURE AND
TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH
The word “Truth” has its
equivalence on the Greek word “Alenthia” and the Latin word “Veritas”, meaning
in general some kind of agreement between thought and its objects, between
knowledge and that which is known.
In its most simple form truth means the accordance of
conformity between what is asserted and what is. According to Aristotle Truth
is primary in judgment. A true judgment is true when it attributes a predicate
to or denies it of a subject according to what reality it demands.1
A true account of the nature of truth can be given in terms
of the condition under which a statement is said to be true or false. However,
the same cannot be done for persons: truth in this case is a derivative sense
of truth. Moreover, truth and false hood are not proper candidates for
sentences as such, in other words, until a statement is used to state that
something is or not the case it is not a candidate for truth. Thus, it is to
statements that truth and falsity are attributable, and invariably to beliefs
of which these statements may be the expression2.
Given that a statement is true. The following questions, at
least, can be raised: what do we mean we say that a statement is true? Are we
attributing a property? What are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for its truth, that is, it is true if and
only if what? These questions are the ones that may be raised concerning any
statement whatever, are all possible candidates for what is meant by the
general question “What is truth”?
Truth can be rightly viewed as a consequential property of
statement. That is to say that it might be a property that statements in virtue
of the fact that other posses in virtue of the fact that other things are true
of them3. In that’s case, the philosophy of truth should decide what
these other things are, that are necessary concerning a statement if it is to
be true.
All this has some sort of
bearing with the correspondence theory of truth.
However, apart from this theory other various theories have
been advocated. The absolute idealist put forward a coherence theory of truth
in which the only absolute truth is “The whole” and anything less than the
whole can only aspire to degrees of truth. Here knowledge is confirmed by
validation procedures4.
Williams James argued for a “pragmatic theory of truth”
according to which the problem of truth is one of the welfare economic, for a
true assertion is one proves the best in the long.
Tarski attempted to avoid the problems of self – references
by claiming that truth can only be defined in a meta language, there by
bringing into being the “Semantic theory of truth”.
F.P Ramsey thought that he had dissolved the problem truth
by pointing out that ‘P’ and 'P' is true
means the same thing and therefore, that is true” is redundant; hence the
redundancy theory of truth for now”, the main objectivistic theory of truth,
mainly the semantic and correspondence theories shall be discussed in detail.
1.2 THE SEMANTIC
THEORY OF TRUTH
This theory is re presented in the vigorous works of Alfred
Tarski on the problem of truth. Going by
this theory, a syntactical system ‘L’ becomes a semantical system when the
rules are given in its meta language ‘M’ which determines the necessary and
sufficient truth condition for every sentence of the system.
These rules, often embodied in a recursive definition, lead
to a definition of truth. And a condition of adequacy for such a definition is
expressed by means of what Tarski calls the “Material Criterion”. The schema
gives this criterion: X is true if and only if P cover P stand, for any
sentences of the given language and X for the name of that sentences.5
Also, Tarski is quick to point out that the definition of
truth must not only be materially adequate but also formally correct, that is,
it must not lead to contradiction.
Using Tarski’s own example, if P is taken to stand for show
is white, then the equivalence schema “T’ while d is true. “The sentence show
is white is true if and only if snow is white”. 6
In Tarski’s View, however
the schema is not taken as providing a complete definition of truth. Tarski
conceives of it as a given necessary condition of a truth7
Viewed in this perspective, one is inclined to that Tarski
semantic theory of truth is another version of the correspondence of truth. It gives truth as objective
character, pointing out that truth is an objective standard against which any
sentence or statement is judge to be or not to be the case. Hence, the many criticisms
that have been leveled on Tarski’s theory centre “correspondence with fact”. Ideals, common to
all objectivistic theories of truth, yet as proper observes Tarski’s theories
has “Rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective”. 8
Similarly, though Tarski tried no cover all his theory with
the clock of a meta – language, thereby arguing that truth cannot be
adequ0ately defined in natural language, it is true as Donald Davidson
observers that Tarski theory applies to English.
Generally then, then, the semantic theory have come to be
regarded as ‘Objectivistics’ and taken to be a version of the correspondence
theory of truth.
1.3
THE CORRESPONDENCE
THEORY OF TRUTH
Wiredu
attempts to establish his thesis that truth is opinion comes by way of story
rejection of the objectivistic theory of truth. According to this theory in
make sense to say that a man’s opinion may change but it is meaningless
nonsense to say that the truth it self may. Once a preposition is true, it is
true in itself and forever. Truth in other words is timeless, eternal9
Wiredu see the objectivistic theory of truth as
“An intellectualized submission of the primitive passions of the soul”.
As he puts it:
“I must confess that the objectivist conception of truth of ten strives
are as a intellectual submission of some what more primitive passions of the
human soul10.
The term “ Correspondence” circulates among modern writers
and this is largely through the influence of Bertrend Russell some forming of
correspondence between belief and fact11. This is as against the
absolute idealist, who holds that truth consist in coherence. The
correspondence theory is an objectivist theory in that is holds that truth of a
statement is independent our opinion and “Consist in a relation, according to
behaviour, which holds between statements’12. For a better
understanding of our subject a brief historical survey would be necessary to
better. Show how different people have
understood the theory at different times.
The origin of the word “Correspondence “used to denote the
relating between though and reality in which the truth of though consists
appears to be medical. Aquinas used the word in this sense when be asserted
that ‘Truth is the adequation of things
and the intellect”. 13
Other scholastics sometimes said that a preposition is true
when, and only when the thing is as signified. This is the nerve of the
correspondence theory of truth.14
The main recommendation of this theory, according to him,
lies in the fact that it does take of aid does not conflict with many millions
of the most obvious fact of truth. One such obvious fact, for instance, is that
the belief by my friend that I have gone away on holidays certainly will be
true, if and only if, I actually have gone away. Hence, the necessary and
sufficient condition for a belief to be true is imply this: “That is should
correspond to fact”.15 This is truth
in the secondary sense . Moore is
quick to point out that it is propositions rather than acts of belief which are
true of false in the primary sense.16 take often say that belief are
truth of false, but this is only because the word “Belief” is often used not
for an act of believing but for what is believed.
There is also a Russialian Version of the correspondence
theory of truth. Starting with the notion of belief Russell argues that the
truth or falsity of a belief always depend upon something which lies outsides
the believe itself. And this leads us to adopt the view that “truth consists in
some form of correspondence between belief and fact”. 17
The
problem, however inherent in this theory is that if truth consists in a
correspondence of thought with something outside thought then thought can never
know when truth is attained.
This apparent difficulty led to concerted efforts among
some philosophers to attempt and find some definition of truth, which shall
not, consists in relation to something wholly outside belief. The most
important attempt at a definition of this sort if the theory that truth
consists in ‘coherence’. But Russell makes it a critique of this theory and
settles down to defend the correspondence theory.
According to Ressell, there is a great difficulty in the
view of coherence. There is no reason to suppose that only one coherent body of
belief is possible. Hence, we are driven back to correspondence with fact as
constituting the nature of truth.
Russell opines that we have to seek a theory of truth which
allows truth to have an opposite, namely, false hood, makes a property of
beliefs but s a property wholly dependent upon the relation of the beliefs to
outside things.
In every act of belief, there is a mind, which believes,
and then is forms concerning which is believes. Whenever a relation holds
between two or more for ms, the mind unites the terms into a complex whole.
Now, a belief in Russell view is true when it corresponds to a certain
associated complex, and false when it does not.
The condition of the truth or a belief in something not involving
beliefs or, in generals, any mind at all but only the objects of the
belief.
A mind, which believes, believes truly involving the mind.
Buts only its objects this correspondence ensures truth and wits absence
entails false hood.